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Abstract: Mobile telephony is described as a "two-sided" market where customers are 
seen as senders and receivers of communications that are mutually beneficial both to 
callers and receivers. This has implications in terms of market definition and market 
power. The economics of mobile call termination is discussed in this context. 
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   Market definition in mobile telephony 
The standard test adopted by most anti-trust and regulatory authorities to 
identify markets is the so-called SSNIP test (sometimes also referred to as 
the "hypothetical monopolist test"). This is designed to explore the 
consequences of a (hypothetical) Small but Significant and Non-transitory 
Increase in Price on the profitability of the (hypothetical) firm that initiates it. 
At the heart of this test lies the question of what might make such a price 
rise unsustainable. Some consumers may switch to substitute products 
("demand-side substitutability") and some firms operating "near" to the 
(narrowly defined) candidate market may alter their plans and supply similar 
products ("supply-side substitutability"). If there are close demand- or 
supply-side substitutes, then the price increase initiated by the hypothetical 
monopolist will lead to a large reduction in its sales, and its profits will, as a 
result, fall. 
                       
(*)  Parts of this paper are based on work carried out by the author for the European 
Commission. The comments from an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The 
opinions expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author. 62     No. 61, 1
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A number of difficulties arise in identifying market boundaries including 
deciding how to treat firms that operate in many related markets, dealing 
with intermediate goods markets, applying the test to markets that are 
already monopolised (known as the "cellophane fallacy"), and determining 
what is "small but significant". 
All of these difficulties occur when applying these general principles to 
mobile telephony markets  1. Customers buy mobile telephones for many 
reasons. Customer profiles are extremely heterogeneous in terms of calling 
patterns, needs, mobility, etc., which is partly reflected in the vast number of 
tariffs on offer in these markets. The needs of a certain customer are 
themselves not immutable, and will depend on factors such as 
circumstances and locations. In principle, therefore, if one defined an 
antitrust market in a very narrow way and purely on the basis of 
substitutability at a given point in time, this exercise would result in a 
proliferation of very narrowly defined markets. At the same time, however, a 
mobile operator is a provider of different products and services that satisfy 
these various needs. In other words, a mobile operator can be seen as a 
multi-product firm. The fact that a firm manufactures or sells more than one 
product may suggest, but by no means implies, that there should be a much 
bigger market for that firm's total output. According to this view, the relevant 
market should include a "cluster" of products, where non-substitutes should 
be included in the same market. 
The concept of cluster markets clearly applies to most services in mobile 
telephony. Customers typically want one handset and one SIM card to 
handle almost all their calls, SMS, etc. Even if one accepts the broader 
concept of a cluster market, an extra layer of complications arises in the 
context of mobile telephony because benefits and costs associated with calls 
generally do not accrue to the same party. When a conversation happens, 
there must be both "senders" and "receivers" involved, which are, by 
definition, different individuals. Clearly, no one would ever want to place a 
call if that call is known not to be received or ever retrieved. Even more 
obviously, one cannot receive a call if this call has not been made! As 
obvious as this may sound, it is a healthy reminder of the type of economic 
considerations that must be taken into account when defining markets, 
without risking the derivation of fictional market definitions. 
                       
1 This paper deals with mobile telephony only, although most of its arguments are also valid 
more generally, including for a deregulated fixed telephony sector. I prefer to stick to the mobile 
case to avoid crucial factors specific to fixed telephony, such as extremely large incumbency 
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As an example, it is a common and useful practice to think of a retail 
market for call origination, although it is clear that this market cannot exist in 
isolation without termination. When the SSNIP test is applied to the market 
for call origination, the analysis should try to assess how the call originator 
would respond to an increase in price, looking for possible substitute 
services etc. This analysis presupposes that the same change in demand for 
calls originated by the sender will also occur on the receiving side, i.e., every 
call is accepted by the receiver. This is, indeed, a very likely situation since 
receivers will not pay for the call in most cases. According to this line of 
analysis, the retail market for call origination is de facto extended to include 
termination as a necessary input for an originated call to be completed. 
Termination is an input that is not directly bought by the call originator, but is 
needed to satisfy the call originator's needs. 
According to this view, there is a retail market for call origination, but not 
a retail market for termination, which is a derived demand instead. Call 
origination and call termination are in a vertical relationship where the 
provider of call origination takes as given the input price for termination, and 
then charges a mark up depending on the price elasticity of outgoing calls. A 
market analysis could therefore find that the retail market for call origination 
is competitive, but the input market for termination is monopolised (and vice-
versa). The distinction between call origination at the retail level and call 
termination at the wholesale level is, to a large extent, fictitious and merely 
reflects common billing practices, rather than the underlying economic 
vertical relationship in the production of a (completed) telephone call (see 
box 1 below). 
Box 1 – Termination: retail or wholesale market? 
Imagine customer A calls customer B and pays pAB to A's provider. A's 
provider then pays a termination charge tB to B's provider. The competitive 
environment that leads to the setting of pAB (at the retail level) may have 
nothing to do with the competitive environment that leads to the setting of tB (at 
the wholesale level). Alternatively, imagine a situation where there is no inter-
carrier compensation, and customer A pays directly pA to provider A for call 
origination and pB to provider B for call termination. In the eyes of customer A, 
the two situations are formally equivalent if, for instance, pA = pAB – tB and pB 
= tB. Once again, the competitive conditions that lead to the setting of pA and 
pB (both at the retail level under this alternative pricing arrangement) could be 
very different. 
The previous example is coherent, but incomplete. In fact, we argued that 
a market for call origination can only exist if there is also a market for 
termination. Implicitly in the previous lines of argument, we assumed that 
termination was needed only by the sender. However, if a call is accepted by 
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calls on the side of the receiver! If one then applies the SSNIP test to this 
market, the exercise looks less straightforward. Which price should one 
increase? And who pays for it? The response of a customer to an increase 
in the price of termination, and therefore the profitability of the (hypothetical) 
firm that initiates it, will differ if the party that bears its cost is the receiver or 
the sender. 
A less formal market definition would at this stage consider the whole 
economic environment, starting from the fact that customers do not demand 
calls per se, rather they want to communicate, for example, exchange 
information. Calls sent and received are just inputs in this exchange of 
information. According to this view, a mobile operator is a provider of a 
"platform" that allows the exchange of communications between these two 
different sides, the senders and the receivers. In this sense, a mobile firm 
should be analysed in the context of the "two-sided markets" framework, 
which has recently received much attention both in academic literature and 
in court cases. 
   Two-sided platforms 
The term "two-sided platforms" (2SPs) refers to products and services that 
must be used by two (or more) groups of customers to be of value to them. 
The "platform" enables interactions between the different "sides", trying to 
get the two sides "on board", and charging each side. 
2SPs are the subject of a recent body of academic literature in economics 
that usually refers to them as "two-sided markets" 2. Since the term "market" 
is used in a different way for the purposes of antitrust policy, this paper 
adopts the more neutral 2SP terminology  3. There is no unequivocal 
definition of 2SPs in existing literature. Rochet and Tirole (2003) proposed 
the following definition: "A market is two-sided if the platform can affect the 
volume of transactions by charging one side of the market more and 
reducing the price on the other side by an equal amount; in other words, the 
price structure matters". 
                       
2 See ROCHET & TIROLE (2003), EVANS (2003), WRIGHT (2004), ARMSTRONG (2006). 
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The previous definition draws an important distinction between price 
structure and price level. This makes 2SPs different from markets 
encountered in textbook economics, where the price structure is typically 
neutral. For instance, in competitive markets it is irrelevant who is charged 
VAT, whether this be the producer or the consumer, since only the price 
level matters for the level of transactions between the two sides (buyers and 
sellers). In 2SPs, on the other hand, the price structure that the two sides 
are charged has an impact on allocation. If the two sides cannot internalise 
externalities between them, then the Coase theorem does not apply and 
market failures can arise. The role of the platform can therefore be that of an 
intermediary, finding the right pricing structure between the two sides and 
allowing trade to take place. 
An alternative definition immediately follows from the previous 
discussion. A 2SP arises in a situation where: (a) there are two (or more) 
sides, with (uninternalised) inter-group network externalities, and (b) 
platforms have the ability to price discriminate between the two sides. 
Definitions aside, it is helpful to give a few examples of 2SPs. EVANS 
(2003) introduces a useful taxonomy of 2SPs: 
•  Exchanges such as security exchanges, auction houses, brokers, and 
various matchmaking activities (for example, employment agencies and real 
estate agents). Exchanges help buyers and sellers search for feasible 
contracts. The externality here arises from the fact that having large number 
of participants on both sides increases the probability that participants will 
find a match. 
•  Advertising-supported media such as newspapers, directories, 
television, and web portals. Media provide contents that attract audiences. 
Audiences, in turn, are used to attract advertisers. There are two kinds of 
externalities between the two sides. Audiences exert a positive externality on 
advertisers, as advertisers value platforms that have more viewers. On the 
contrary, advertisers exert a negative effect on viewers, at least to the extent 
that commercials interrupt a programme, or make it more difficult to 
consume content. 
•  Transaction systems such as credit cards. These are similar to 
exchanges in some respects, as cardholders and merchants are more likely 
to adopt a particular credit card the greater the number of adopters of the 
same card on the other side. They also have some peculiar features, namely 
card associations are cooperative 2SPs: for a transaction to be completed 
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various risks between the entity that services the cardholder and the entity 
that services the merchant. 
•  Software platforms such as PCs, video games and music players. The 
two sides here are represented by users who want to run software 
applications and developers who write applications and sell them to users. 
Are 2SPs relevant for telephony? Clearly, any network operator is a 
multi-product firm. However, the mere fact that multiple product or "cluster" 
markets are involved does not imply that a 2SP is implicated. If the various 
products are bought and consumed by the same customer, there is no 2SP 
involved since there are no inter-group network externalities. Therefore, 
services such as access and call origination can be analysed, to a large 
degree, with standard antitrust tools that do not need to be extended to the 
analysis of 2SPs. 
There are situations where 2SPs can be applied to telephony too. An 
important case in point is call termination. A network operator, in this case, 
falls in the category of "exchanges" introduced above, as it allows "senders" 
and "receivers" to complete their match, i.e., communicate. There is an 
externality involved as senders can communicate more the higher the 
number of receivers they can contact, and receivers are likely to benefit from 
receiving many calls the larger the number of senders there are  4. More 
generally, termination revenues form an integral part of the way an operator 
sets prices for both termination and outgoing services. These can be distinct 
services, but have close inter-relationships since the demand and price for 
one service affects the other.  
Although we will analyse call termination markets only in a later section, 
we anticipate here that the exercise of market power when setting 
termination rates is likely to differ when calls are sent and received "on-net" 
(i.e., senders and receivers both subscribe to the same network operator) 
and when they are "off-net" (i.e., senders and receivers belong to different 
network).  
In the former case, the "platform" is likely to internalise externalities 
between the two sides, and the presence of competition limits the ability of 
                       
4 It could be argued that mobile users belong to the same group. One should therefore speak of 
"intra-group externalities", rather than "inter-group" externalities typical of 2SPs. However, 
please note that my description of the problem relies on having "senders" and "receivers", which 
represent the two groups that need a platform to conduct an exchange of communications. In 
this sense, I would argue that the definition of a 2SP applies to mobile telephony literally. T. VALLETTI  67 
the network operator to raise termination prices. In the latter case, the 
network operator will not internalise the effects on senders when setting the 
termination rate and market failure is likely to arise. A specific example of 
such market failure is the case of fixed-to-mobile (F2M) calls 5. 
Two-sided platforms: market definition and market power 
When applying market definitions to 2SPs one has to be particularly 
careful to avoid mechanical applications of commonly used concepts due to 
the possibly intricate relationship between the various sides. When dealing 
with a 2SP, it is essential to evaluate if network effects (i.e., links between 
the two sides) are: (a) present, and (b) limit the extent to which a price 
increase on either side is profitable. This exercise is tricky as it mixes 
several factors: which price should be increased? Who pays for this 
increase? What is the starting level for the price increase? Should a firm re-
adjust its entire structure of prices when only one price changes? 
Take, as an example, the case of F2M calls and mobile access. Are they 
complements or substitutes? The answer to this type of question is of some 
use in "normal" markets, as substitute goods are typically presumed to 
belong to the same relevant market. Imagine first an increase in the price of 
mobile access. Demand for mobile access would go down as a direct 
consequence of the price increase. As there would then be fewer mobile 
customers to call, demand for F2M calls would also fall. As seen from this 
perspective, F2M calls and mobile access seem to be complements. Now 
imagine increasing the price of mobile termination, starting from the 
termination cost. Demand for F2M calls would decrease because fixed users 
would have to pay more to call mobile phones. However, the increase in the 
price of mobile termination has also introduced some termination revenues 
that did not exist when termination was set at its cost. If there is some 
competition for mobile users, these termination profits should, at least to 
some extent, be passed on to mobile users. A likely scenarios would be for 
the mobile network operator to push down the price of mobile access. This, 
in turn, should boost demand for mobile access. From this point of view, an 
increase in the price of F2M termination increases demand for mobile 
access, while F2M calls and mobile access now seem to be substitutes! 
                       
5 The theory of two-sided markets received some prominence in the recent case on mobile 
termination rates in New Zealand; see NZ Commerce Commission (2005). 68     No. 61, 1
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a full analysis of the 
termination problem here  6. Our main point is that questions, such as 
whether F2M calls and mobile access are complements or substitutes, do 
not make much sense when they mechanically apply standard notions of 
substitutability and complementarity to highly specific market realities, such 
as 2SPs. As we have already seen, a mobile operator is a "platform" that 
provides access among other things (and the corresponding price is paid by 
mobile consumers), but also enables the termination of calls initiated by 
fixed users. The price for termination is indirectly paid by fixed users and, 
typically, not by mobile users. These are the main features that have to be 
taken into account when conducting an economic analysis of the termination 
problem. 
Another important caveat, when defining markets in the presence of 
2SPs, applies to the use of the SSNIP test. Firstly, when a price is 
increased, the corresponding demand will decrease, as in standard markets, 
but there may also be additional effects arising from the other side that may, 
or may not decrease the profitability of the price increase, according to the 
type of inter-group network externalities involved. For instance, in an 
exchange such as a matchmaker, where one side benefits from the 
presence of high numbers from the other side, imagine the platform 
increases the price it charges to one particular side. This will reduce the 
number of buyers from this side, making it less appealing for the other side 
to join the platform, further reducing demand from the original side. In this 
case there is a "multiplier" effect, as a price increase reduces demand more 
than in standard one-sided markets. In the case of advertising-supported 
media, on the other hand, imagine the platform increases the price it 
charges one side (advertisers). This should decrease the number of 
commercials bought by advertisers, making it more appealing for the other 
side (viewers) to join the platform  7. Secondly, it is not clear where the 
hypothetical price increase should originate from. The cost of a product is 
typically not an efficient benchmark in the presence of 2SPs. Perhaps more 
disappointingly, even the price level set in a "competitive market" is not 
efficient. This should not come as a surprise since it is well known in 
economics that competitive markets "work", i.e., they are efficient and any 
intervention could just make things worse, only without externalities. This 
                       
6 See WRIGHT (2002), and VALLETTI & HOUPIS (2005). 
7 I assume that other variables such as programme quality or content are not affected. The 
important point here is that it is easy to construct situations where the "multiplier" effect can go 
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fundamental result can be rephrased by saying that, in the presence of 
externalities, even competitive markets do not work and some appropriate 
intervention can increase the welfare of society. 
It therefore seems that trying to define sharp boundaries can be a risky 
exercise with 2SPs. Since from a legal standpoint, in practice, market 
definition requires that a product is found to be either in the market or 
outside it, a possible reasonable compromise would be to look at standard 
(possibly narrow) market definition to start with. Then, the impact on 
competition in "affected" markets (therefore, extending the analysis beyond 
the original market definition) could be considered at a later stage when 
conducting a full economic analysis, eventually leading to the imposition of 
appropriate remedies. Alternatively, one could start with the whole products 
under consideration, avoiding the exercise of market definition and directly 
delving into the economic problem at stake. For an economist, this second 
approach is bound to give the same answer (and therefore the same set of 
possible remedies) as the first approach. However, it is not clear if, from a 
legal standpoint, these two approaches are also identical. For instance, SMP 
may be found over the narrowly defined market, which would imply the 
introduction of some remedies, "adjusted" for the two-sidedness feature of 
the market investigated. However, SMP may not be found if one started from 
the whole set of interlinked products, where SMP is linked to the presence of 
some extra rent that the firm can sustain overall. Therefore an investigation 
may not start although "welfare enhancing" regulation would also be 
available in this case. 
While there is not much disagreement on economic analysis, there may 
be some divergence between the legal and economic approach to the main 
questions addressed. This is a fundamental and controversial point that 
harks back to the meaning of SMP and the ultimate objective of regulatory 
and antitrust intervention. Competition law can maintain competition, but 
typically cannot create it or cure defects or market failures. It also cannot 
impose very precise obligations. On the contrary, regulation usually has 
aims that are wider than those of competition law, and has methods that go 
beyond those of competition law, because regulators can impose additional 
or new duties necessary to promote the objectives specified. In the specific 
context of 2SPs, it therefore follows that competition law should not be able 
to deal with inefficient pricing structures arising from competition in two-sided 
markets. This is because competition law assumes that firms can unilaterally 
desist from the conduct that is undesirable. Fines and other anti-trust 
sanctions rely on firms being able to take unilateral action to comply and to 
act competitively. However, in 2SPs a firm cannot unilaterally lower a 70     No. 61, 1
st Q. 2006 
particular price that is deemed to be "wrong" (for example, too high) if the 
other competitors do not - that would result in losses relative to the rivals. 
The threat of fines thus does not work in this context, because no individual 
firm can comply. The consequence of this reasoning is that any intervention 
has to ensure collective compliance - either by all firms having the same 
unilateral incentives at the same time (for example, by setting up a position 
in which the authority effectively requires them to "collude"!) or by their 
conduct being subject to some exogenous constraint (which is another word 
for regulation). 
Conclusions on 2SPs 
2SPs involve inter-group network externalities and are relevant in many 
industries, including telecommunications. As a result of these externalities, 
socially-optimal prices in 2SPs typically depend in some intricate way on 
price elasticities of demand, inter-group network effects and costs. This is a 
complex exercise that can be conducted by taking into account market 
realities and avoiding mechanical applications of standard definitions and 
tools. 
Another result of externalities is that socially-optimal prices in 2SPs, 
generally, are not purely cost-based. By understanding the nature of the 
problem, it is therefore easy to avoid possible fallacies. For instance, 
incremental cost pricing is typically not efficient with 2SPs. High individual 
mark-ups may also not indicate standard market power. A more balanced 
pricing structure (interpreted as prices being more in line with costs) is not 
necessarily produced by fiercer competition. Moreover, the removal of 
alleged cross-subsidies, such as decreasing one price (A) and increasing 
another price (B), does not necessarily benefit the side (A) that pays a price 
above cost. This is because, by increasing the other price (B), some B users 
may drop off, thus making the product less valuable to A users as well. 
Firms with the features of a 2SP are correct to stress the fact that these are 
special markets, which policy-markers consequently need to be very careful 
with. We agree with this point and always advocate a full and appropriate 
economic analysis of these markets. However, we conclude by recalling 
that, even if a two-sided market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, then 
the market does not work. This is in stark contrast with standard one-sided 
markets: when these markets are competitive, they are also efficient and no 
regulator should interfere with their working. In two-sided markets, on the T. VALLETTI  71 
other hand, privately chosen prices, even when ideally set by competing 
firms, will differ from socially-optimal prices. An appropriate intervention can 
increase consumer and social welfare. 2SPs should therefore be subject to 
more, rather than less regulatory oversight. 
   Incoming and outgoing calls 
Let me now return to market definition in mobile telephony. People buy 
mobile phones to have access, that is, what they buy is the ability to make 
and receive different kind of calls while travelling in different places. Access 
typically involves the purchase of a handset and a SIM card. After having 
secured access, customers then use their phones, that is, they do make and 
receive different kinds of calls while travelling in different places. Access, 
outgoing calls, and incoming calls are the three general groups of services 
that represent the starting point of the analysis of market definition in mobile 
telephony. One consequently needs to understand how a customer would 
react when a hypothetical monopolist increases the price of one of these 
three services. 
This apparently simple exercise has to be done while taking into account 
relevant features of the economic environment under consideration. A 
crucial aspect in the mobile telephony industry is that, in the absence of any 
intervention, the party making and paying for the call is typically the sender 
and not the receiver of the call. This arrangement, known as CPP ("Calling 
Party Pays") is adopted in all countries in the EU. Under CPP, the service is 
initiated by, and paid for by, the caller to the mobile phone, not the mobile 
phone owner. A SSNIP test conducted on the price of access or outgoing 
calls is therefore a very different exercise to a hypothetical increase in the 
price of incoming calls, since, under the current pricing arrangements, in the 
former case it is the telephone owner that pays directly for the price 
increase, while in the latter there is no direct payment involved, although the 
receiver may indirectly suffer from receiving less calls. As a result of this 
fundamental difference, the analysis of access and outgoing calls has to be 
kept separate from the analysis of incoming calls. This paper does not 
consider access and outgoing calls here, as the analysis can be conducted, 
to a large extent, with standard tools (such as "cluster" markets), but focuses 
instead only on the market for "incoming" calls. 72     No. 61, 1
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Incoming calls 
Mobile customers want to receive calls. Under the CPP system, these 
calls are initiated and paid by other customers. Given this peculiar feature, 
the exercise of market definition should be conducted looking at the 
behaviour of both the sender and the receiver. Let us start with the sender 
first. The sender has a demand for calls to a particular person owning a 
mobile phone. Calls to mobile phones do not have strong demand 
substitutes, as senders typically are willing to pay a premium if they need to 
contact a person without knowing her exact location. If the price of a call to a 
mobile network goes up, a caller would probably reduce the number and/or 
length of calls, according to her demand elasticity, but it is very unlikely that 
the caller can find good alternative substitutes. A call is typically placed to a 
mobile user when the caller wants to be sure to contact and interact in real 
time with the called party, for which there is no effective substitute. The 
sender therefore has very limited ability to find substitutes if the price of calls 
to mobile goes up because of a price increase initiated by the mobile 
operator that terminates the call 8. 
The behaviour of senders therefore does not impose any limit on the ability 
of the mobile firm to increase the price of incoming calls. However, this 
analysis is incomplete since constraints on increases in the price of incoming 
calls can also arise if receivers themselves react to an increase in the price 
of a call to a mobile. For instance, if the receiver cares about the satisfaction 
of the sender, then the price of calls to mobile telephones will be 
internalised. The latter case is sometimes referred to as "closed user 
groups" and can correspond to families that behave under a single budget 
constraint, or some business users who provide different sorts of telephony 
services to their employees. These can constitute a large part of the 
customer base of a mobile operator. Mobile operators, however, have the 
ability to price discriminate among different groups, for instance by offering 
discounts to large business users, hence their presence does not seem to 
restrict overall price levels for other customers. 
                       
8 Continuing with the example presented in box 1, where customer A is the caller and customer 
B is the receiver, this price increase could be paid directly by the sender if the price pB for 
termination is paid directly by customer A to B's provider at the retail level. If, instead, A's 
provider bills customer A and then pays a termination charge to B's provider, the price increase 
would be initiated at the wholesale level (tB) and have repercussions at the retail level (pAB). In 
this latter case (the most common situation in practice), the demand for B's provider is a derived 
(input) demand to be analyzed at the wholesale level. In both cases, however, customer A has 
a limited ability to find a substitute means of contacting customer B. T. VALLETTI  73 
The receiver may still limit the provider's ability to charge others high 
prices. In fact, if the price of incoming calls increases, the number of calls 
received will decrease, which has a negative effect on the satisfaction of the 
receiver, since receiving calls is clearly one of the incentives of subscribing 
to a mobile telephone in the first instance. However, this is not necessarily a 
disadvantage for consumers that receivers can easily see or react to. It is 
documented by several NRAs (for example, Ofcom) that receivers' 
awareness of the price of calls to mobile telephones is low and that the price 
of incoming calls is not considered by subscribers to be an important factor 
in their choice of mobile operator and other factors are more influential. The 
mobile owner cares most about the prices s/he has to pay to subscribe to 
and place calls with a mobile operator, but in most cases will not take into 
account the prices paid by other callers to contact him/her. In fact, mobile 
telephone owners may enjoy a higher level of overall satisfaction if an 
increase in the price of incoming calls, despite reducing the number of 
incoming calls, induces the mobile operator to decrease other prices directly 
paid by subscribers. 
When assessing what type of dominant behaviour might arise in the 
market for incoming calls, it is useful to distinguish between the following 
three types of mobile incoming calls: 
-  calls to mobile (on-net), 
-  calls to mobile (off-net), 
-  calls to mobile (from other non-mobile networks, mostly F2M calls in 
practice). 
In principle, given that a mobile firm is by definition the only firm that can 
terminate calls for its own customers, SMP in the form of single dominance 
should arise, no matter what type of call is under consideration. However, as 
mentioned repeatedly above, in this market both a sender and a receiver are 
involved and their identity cannot be neglected. 
In the case of on-net calls to mobile, if the mobile firm tried to increase 
the price of the termination end of the call, the sender that would suffer the 
price increase would be one of its own customers. An increase in termination 
price would make the overall package offered by the firm to its subscribers 
less appealing, and the firm would lose customers as a result. Competitive 
forces do act as a constraint on the firm's behaviour, hence there is not likely 
to be any market power abused in this case. In terms of the analogy with 
two-sided markets, in this case the mobile firm is a platform that perfectly 
"internalises" transactions that only affect its customers. 74     No. 61, 1
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Contrary to on-net calls, single dominance is likely to exist for the other 
two kinds of incoming calls, mobile off-net calls and calls to mobile from 
other networks (F2M calls). In these two instances, the sending party that 
pays the call is not one of the firm's customers and the firm's receiving 
customers would not react to a price increase, which gives the mobile firm 
the ability to set the price at monopoly levels. From the point of view of 
single dominance, these two types of calls are therefore quite similar. 
There is nonetheless one possible important difference between these 
two types of incoming calls to mobile from other customers. The difference 
lies in the strategic environment. Off-net calls are charged to customers 
belonging to a rival mobile network, while there no strategic interaction 
between a mobile firm and a fixed firm, as these are to a large extent 
separate markets. 
As customers buy mobile phones with the purpose of receiving calls from 
other customers, a firm might be tempted to increase its off-net termination 
price in order to distort competition in the market. This incentive exists, on 
top of the termination monopolisation effect, only for mobile off-net calls. For 
instance, a mobile firm could set a high off-net termination charge, so that 
the overall off-net price paid by rival customers is high. Customers would be 
willing to join a bigger network: on-net calls, to the extent that they are 
cheaper than off-net calls, imply that customers would be receiving relatively 
more incoming calls. 
What we have described to far can be said about the price incoming calls 
in general, without distinguishing whether these calls are set at the 
"wholesale" level as termination charges or at the "retail" level charging 
senders directly (see box 1 again for this analogy). There is, however, a 
possible main difference with the "retail" market analysis of incoming calls. If 
the sending party was billed directly by the receiving operator, it seems 
natural that the termination price is set directly by the receiving network, thus 
the sending customer has no bargaining power. Instead, at the wholesale 
level, the termination price is more likely to be negotiated between the 
sending and the receiving network. Countervailing buyer power (i.e., 
bargaining, negotiations) should therefore be taken into account when 
analysing the wholesale market for incoming calls in order to determine the 
presence of SMP. 
In particular, a bargaining model seems quite appropriate to an analysis 
of the market for "off-net" M2M calls, as this is a bilateral problem of "two-
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one in each direction. One network, when negotiating the wholesale price for 
sending calls to the rival network, can always use its own wholesale price for 
receiving calls from the rival as an effective threat in the bargaining game. In 
this context, there are different sets of results from the literature 9:  
•  Bilateral wholesale negotiations can get rid of inefficiencies, given the 
reciprocal nature of bargaining. This is true particularly for negotiations 
among symmetrically-placed networks. 
•  Bilateral negotiations may be used to affect the intensity of 
competition at the retail level. The nature of collusion may be different: 
-  Collusion may happen in a "static" framework by setting high 
termination rates because of a "raise-each-other's-cost" effect  10. This 
result holds true only under particular circumstances, namely retail prices 
should be linear (which may be applicable to pre-paid cards), while it 
does not apply under more sophisticated retail pricing structures (two-
part tariffs, for example, monthly rental plus price per minute of usage). 
-  Collusion may also happen in a more standard "dynamic" framework, 
where networks repeatedly interact with each other. The role of 
wholesale termination charges may be one of giving a "focal" reference 
point to set collusive retail prices. Please note that, in this case, joint 
dominance should be established at the retail level, while the wholesale 
level may facilitate reaching the collusive agreement. 
The applicability of a bargaining model to the determination of the 
wholesale price for termination of F2M calls is more controversial  11. In a 
bargaining model, two parties have to find a way to divide the surplus 
created by finding a deal. This division is influenced by the outside options 
that the parties have, i.e., what they could get if they threaten not to strike a 
                       
9 See ARMSTRONG (2002), LAFFONT & TIROLE (2000), VOGELSANG (2003), CAMBINI & 
VALLETTI (2005). 
10 To see this, imagine what happens when operators charge customers collusive (monopoly) 
retail prices. If mobile customers call each other with the same probability, the traffic is balanced 
and an operator pays the rival the same amount for termination services that it receives from 
the rival for similar services, independently of the value taken by the termination charge. This 
can be an equilibrium only if no one has a unilateral incentive to deviate. If one firm deviates 
from the monopoly retail charges by undercutting the rival, it induces its subscribers to call 
more. Since part of the calls made is destined for the rival's network, the effect of a price cut is 
to send out more calls than it receives on–net from the rival. The resulting net outflow of calls 
has an associated deficit that is particularly burdensome if the unit termination charge is high. 
This will discourage under-pricing in the first place. Some conditions are necessary to produce 
this outcome, for instance products should not be too homogeneous, otherwise the incentive to 
undercut would have the additional benefit of increasing market share. 
11 See BINMORE & HARBORD (2005), UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (2005). 76     No. 61, 1
st Q. 2006 
deal. The "threat" points are not as natural as in the bilateral negotiation of 
termination of M2M calls. In the case of F2M calls, the negotiated price is 
only "one way", as the other way (M2F) is typically regulated. This 
asymmetric treatment of M2F and F2M calls is a possible source of 
distortion that must be noted. 
This problem of "bargaining in the shadow of regulation" still has to be 
clarified in full. However, some related aspects have received partial 
answers. For instance, an argument put forward has been that, to have a 
viable business, a small MNO must have an interconnection agreement with 
the incumbent fixed-network operator. This argument mixes up incoming 
calls and all other services. In fact, as a first cut, the bargaining problem 
does not seem to be affected by the size of a MNO. The size of the MNO 
affects the total surplus to be bargained over, not its division. This is 
because, once MNOs have some subscribers, bargaining might occur over 
calls destined to those customers, therefore without substitution possibilities. 
As a result, we can conclude that the existence of countervailing buyer 
power over the setting of termination prices does not seem more likely for 
small MNOs 12.  
   Conclusions 
Practitioners and policy makers should not forget that the role of market 
definition is to provide a basis on which regulators or anti-trust authorities 
calculate important indicators such as market shares, etc., in making their 
prima facie case. However, one should be very careful not to make too much 
of market delineations. Market definition is not a substitute for a full analysis 
of the likely competitive effects in a certain economic environment under 
examination. The task of defining markets should not be confused with the 
assessment of competitive effects and efficiencies. In practice, this means 
that many subtle interactions that may be missed when defining markets as 
a first cut, can be taken into account at later stages, for example, when 
assessing market power and eventually imposing remedies. 
 
                       
12 In fact, there are theoretical arguments (and some empirical evidence) for supporting the 
opposite result: smaller networks charge more for F2M termination than bigger networks in the 
presence of consumer ignorance, mobile number portability, or no discrimination requirements 
for F2M calls. See GANS & KING (2000) and WRIGHT (2002). T. VALLETTI  77 
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